A solider precides over the annual Victory Day parade on Red Square, Moscow. (EPA/Sergei Chirikov) |
On April 23,
Ukrainian security forces resumed operations against separatists in the regions
of Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and other cities in the regions of Luhandsk and
Donetsk. The response is largely due to the occupation of pro-Russian activists
who have occupied key administration buildings in over a dozen Ukrainian cities.
Once more, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Kiev is not
doing enough to disarm illegal groups in Eastern Ukraine. While the illegal
armed activity in Eastern Ukraine indicates to Moscow-leaning, the pushes made
by Lavrov indicate that Moscow is not entirely sympathetic.
For Russia,
Ukraine is a strategic necessity. It has been a necessary entity of Russian
foreign policy as far back as the 17th century, when the Russian
Empire aimed to integrate Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, Central Asia and
Siberia. Under the Tsardom of Russia, the core principality of Muscovy
possessed little resources -- it was through pursuing eastward, the conquest of
Siberia, for the conquest of fur that it became the overarching Eurasia giant
that it is today.
The origins
The St.Petersburg-Moscow
axis was the core of this growing empire. With it, Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia
occupied the centre of mass of the empire, possessing important agricultural
settlements and crucially a buffer to foreign entities on the road to Moscow.
The vast
geographical territory that Russia occupies on a glance of an Atlas is
intimidating. Once more, it has done so without having been the prosperous nation.
The Russian empire was powerful – but it wasn’t prosperous. The Soviet Union
was powerful, but it wasn’t prosperous either; whilst military and economic
constitute power, Russia has never exceeded its opponents in either. Yet, Russia
remains undefeated in the face of invasion – Napoleon and Hitler tried and
failed, partly due to failure on the invaders end and partly due to the
defender’s strategy.
In order to
explore this, it is important to examine the crucial factor as to why Russia is
not as prosperous. Firstly, the regions occupying Ukraine and Russia enjoy some
of the finest agricultural land in Europe. The Russian Empire made it a
priority to economically integrate the farmlands of Ukraine into the Russian
economy and reap the harvest that the lands produced. Moreover, it wished to
supply the rest of the empire from the Ukrainian source of harvest. However,
this came with a caveat.
The caveat lies
predominately in Russia’s geography. From the North European Plain, it is navigable.
However, from the more southern-eastern regions of Russia, upon the borderlands
of the empire, the geography is difficult and establishing infrastructure was
troublesome. The struggle to redistribute agricultural goods across the economy
lies in the fact that transportation was difficult.
For other
regions such as the United States and Germany, these nations benefited profusely
by having an interconnected river network that allowed fast, cheap redistribution
of goods and trade across the region. Economic integration relied primarily on
the investment and construction of railways during the 18th and 19th
centuries in order to economically integrate the vast territory.
Adapting to geographical constraints
The inherent
weakness of economic integration led principally to the underdevelopment of the
Empire and the Soviet Union, there relative weaknesses and constraints meant
they were unable to compete with Western Europe. More so, the emphasis on lower-development
between regions was the source of economic motivation to integrate with one
another. This was achieved concurrently with the main aim of Russia to maintain
and incorporate the greater regions into the core of Moscow. Whilst economics
may have been one main reason for amalgamation of various nationalities,
regions and provinces under one empire and union, another main reason is
security and Moscow’s institutions.
Geopolitics has
the inherent trait of being ubiquitous throughout history, wielding the ability
to constrain and empower nations. Geography cannot be moulded – a state must
mould and adapt to geographical constraints and advantages it has bequeathed.
In 2005, Vladimir Putin stated that the greatest “geopolitical tragedy of the
20th century” was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. What Putin is
referring to are the institutions and practices that allowed the Soviet Union to
remain unified. Namely, this was the security apparatus that provided the arc
for which Moscow was able to craft policy and suppress internal power
struggles, both in the capital and in the greater regions.
This was not unique
to the Soviet Union – Russian Empire possessed a vast counterintelligence
network anchored to suppress political dissidents and opposition to the Tsar
rule. For over two centuries, the Russian intelligence network remained the
most efficient, actionable and modern institution. The claim by Moscow for it
to be the core of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union consistently had an
underbelly of opposition. Whether it is through religious, ethnic or national
grounds, there was a rationale to challenge the core. Moscow had created and
maintained a state inherently artificial in retrospect to its Western European
counterparts.
An overarching
ideology has been a defining feature of the empire and the union. In the
Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox Church provided the framework and
supplemented the security apparatus which provided the justification for the structure.
Together, the Russian Orthodox Church and the security apparatus sought to
identify political and religious dissidents, which they did to great success.
The transformation
from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union concurrently transformed the
ideological narrative for which enhanced the security apparatus. Marxist-Leninism,
theoretically, was more efficient for the Soviet Union. Firstly, it was hostile
to all religions – where the Russian Orthodox Church may create rift between competition
religious factions, Marxist-Leninism was hostile to them all. Secondly, it was
indifferent to many various ethnicities and nations that populated the state.
The security
apparatus was and is instrumental for systematically maintaining power in
Moscow. A persistent threat for Moscow has always been internal and external.
Internally, it does not enjoy the fruits of nation-state building. It
consistently must monitor and react to separatist movements which wish to break
away from the control of Moscow. Externally, it is geographically indefensible.
Russia possesses no geographical natural barriers to preclude it from invasion.
The road to Moscow is the North European Plain, a favourable invasion highway
of fertile and relatively flat land that can aid standing armies and battalions
at brisk pace upon the march to the capital.
Security considerations
To navigate the
internal and external security discrepancies, power in Russia has traditionally
been autocratic. The security of Russia is inherently fragile; autocracy,
repression and control are of paramount importance to sustain Russian national
security. The political agility that an autocracy provides stems Russia’s
historical acquisition of this style of governance. It is rooted in the Russian
psychological fear of insecurity whereby the weaknesses are recognized and only
manageable – they are inherently unfixable.
The Soviet
Union managed the internal and external challenges with success. It achieved
great territorial gains in the Second World War and its reach expanded westward
to Central Europe, installing a government moulded by the Kremlin’s vision in
East Germany. The creation of the Warsaw Pact is arguably the first instance
where Russia’s strategic necessity had been fully successful. Where the Russian
Empire could not fully control and project power over Eastern Europe, Napoleon
sought to invade and conquer. Once more, Operation Barbarossa aimed to exploit
the geographical weaknesses of the road to Moscow to conquer the Soviet Union.
Both invasions ran into difficulty by the elaborate use of buffer zones that
were instrumental in Moscow’s defence.
By 1945, the
Soviet Union had achieved total defence of its frontiers with the creation of
interlaying buffer zones matched with an offensive posture on Western Europe. While
there were plans, to invade the Soviet Union would have been tremendously
difficult and categorically pyrrhic if such an invasion was to occur by any
angle.
Therefore, it
is easy to understand why the fall of the Soviet Union was seen as a geopolitical
disaster for Russia. It had lost its former borders which solidified and provided
security for the core of Russia. Once more, the security apparatus which held
the regions together ultimately imploded. The fall of the Soviet Union damaged
and questioned the traditional institutions that preceded Russia for centuries.
It was then
when political commentators such as Francis Fukuyama envisaged an “End of
History” scenario in which the wars of ideology were a thing of the past and
that liberal democracy would preserve without resistance. In hindsight, we see
that the Russian system, whether Marxist-Leninist or monarchic, the ideology
perpetrated was subservient to geopolitical interest.
Russia’s former-self
After 1991,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation under Yeltsin
travelled into what was known as “The chaos”. From 1991-2000, the Russian
Federation underwent a period of great difficulty. It had lost its former
frontiers in Ukraine and Central Asia, it had engulfed itself into a failing
counterinsurgency in Chechnya in 1995, oligarchs began to monopolize the energy
and services sectors of the economy, it had been humiliated in Kosovo by having
its opposition to the war ignored and poverty increased coupled with economic inequality
and unemployment rose to dangerous levels.
It is clear
that the liberal experiment under Yeltsin has failed. In 2000, Vladimir Putin
came into office with a clear objective of resuming the working institutions
that allowed the weaknesses of Russia’s geopolitical position to be managed.
During the 00s, Putin systematically restored power back to the core of Moscow
through judicial and executive reform, revitalizing the security apparatus.
Furthermore, using the aforementioned security apparatus, he was able to pull
the oligarchs under the Kremlin’s control and has taken steps to bolster Russia’s
power in the international stage, both to regional neighbours and greater
rivals.
However, a
great challenge to Putin in the 21st century is internal legitimacy.
Nationalist drives may win the support in the regions surrounding Moscow but Russia
inhabits an incredibly diverse spectrum of ethnicities, driven by different
historical traditions and contrasting political destinies. Internal legitimacy
comes from the promise of security and prosperity. The latter more contentious but
this promise is fuelled by the premise of a strong Russia that is able to
project power in Eurasia. To do this, Putin has adopted a framework of using
Russia as an industrial power – an exporter of raw materials, namely natural
gas, to systematically entrench influence and dependence with Central and
Eastern Europe.
Ukraine, an artificial
nation, is polarized. For Russia to be able to project power in Eurasia and for
it to be a regional power, let alone a global one, it must have Ukraine.
Ukraine has been the traditional hub and centre of mass for the preceding
Russian empire and union. It is also the transport hub for Russia’s exportation
of natural gas into Central Europe. Once more, Ukraine possesses a heavily integrated
economic industrial base which Russia benefits, particularly in Eastern
Ukraine.
Therefore, a
challenge to Ukraine is a challenge to Russian national security. In 2004, the
Orange Revolution, in the eyes of Moscow, represented a challenge to Russia’s
national security. It was seen that the United States was intending to segment
the Russian Federation through the use of nongovernmental organizations to
promote pro-Western governments with the objective of joining the EU and NATO.
For Putin, this
was unacceptable and it challenged his internal legitimacy. Therefore, Putin
had to show regions such as Ukraine that Russia was a major regional power
while exposing the United States’ lack of commitment to integrating Eastern Europe
into the United States’ umbrella. Georgia, a client-state of the United States,
was invaded in 2008. The Russo-Georgian was executed at a time where the United
States had engaged its state and military forces and services in the Middle
East – Eastern Europe was not part of its periphery.
The 2014
Ukrainian uprisings have represented similar challenges to Putin’s leadership.
However, Putin has responded forcefully, on the tail of a defensive strategy to
consolidate Ukraine. The invasion of Crimea and annexation is a testament to
Russia’s commitment to maintaining its frontiers by applying pressure on Kiev.
In some ways, it’s undermined itself by taking a vast portion of pro-Russian
voters in Crimea out of the Kiev central government electoral pool, weakening a
pro-Russian opposition. However, inaction is more costly for Putin. Inaction
leaves a vacuum of speculation and room to challenge Putin’s neo-Czarist rule –
where the Kremlin is in continuous battle with internal strife, any challenges
to the core of Russia is extremely detrimental. Putin must utilize the tools of
his autocratic predecessors in order to navigate Russia’s geopolitical struggle
and execute its strategic imperatives.