A motion to engage in military intervention in Syria was opposed by the UK's main opposition party on Aug 30 Stefan Rousseau/PA Wire |
US-UK History
The United States and the United Kingdom have been
exceptionally close allies for well over a century. The relationship signifies a unique
willingness to forget historical grievances and co-operate based on similar international
interests. This is especially true when
recalling the UK’s historical role as America’s colonial ruler and to this day,
remains the only nation to have ever assaulted Washington D.C. and set the
White House ablaze. Nevertheless, today
they remain two of the closet allies on the international scene. Whilst there is speculation and scepticism
about the equality of the partnership, only the US-Israeli relationship seems
to stand out as an example of bilateral co-operation that may exceed the “Special
Relationship” that the US and the UK enjoy.
It is worth noting that this is not the first time the
relationship has been tested by difference of opinion. The US and the UK have previously found each
other at odds on several occasions, increasing the possibility that the recent
parliamentary vote is just a hiccup in a continuing relationship. The Suez
Canal conflict in 1956, The Yom Kippur War, The Vietnam War and the US invasion of Grenada are just few incidents that
the US and the UK have initially found themselves ideologically opposed, or at
least initially so.
The Commons vote does have greater implications than just a
difference of opinion for US-UK relations however. The “Special relationship” is often seen as
the starting point for building any international military coalition, i.e. the
UK is the first nation of reference when the USA is preparing an
intervention. Historically the UK has
seldom refused participation in US led action. Vietnam is the only major example where the UK has outright refused to
commit militarily in recent years upon being asked. At the time, this had devastating
repercussions for several years. Lyndon
B. Johnson was so furious at the time he spent the rest of his presidency
focusing on his ties with other Anglo nations such as Canada and Australia.
The fallout from the UK’s refusal is already visible. Obama’s multi-national efforts
appear to be falling apart already. Now
that there is a realisation among NATO’s members that even the UK can
apparently refuse the call of duty, it may not be long before other nations
similarly do so. The very notion that
even the US’s most powerful ally will not support military action does very
little to inspire confidence regarding the mission’s ability to succeed. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that
the vote has managed to serve as a substantial embarrassment to both Washington
and the British Cabinet.
Britain now appears
spectacularly weak on the international scene. Despite its leaders talk for
tough action, it is apparently unable to convince its own legislature to take
action. Given that the UK is fighting an uphill struggle to maintain its status
on the international scene against rising powers such as India and China, the
nation may find that the summit has risen exponentially. It is all the more embarrassing that David
Cameron was one the leaders most ardently campaigning for action against the Assad
regime. Externally, it appears that
Cameron is unable to even gather the full support of his own party to follow
the government’s lead. All the more
frustrating considering that the Prime Minister does not actually require the
support of the House of Commons to initiate hostilities, rather this was a
formality introduced by Tony Blair.
This will not go unnoticed in Washington, especially given
the responses from Damascus and Moscow. Given statements of what appeared to
be barely contained enthusiasm who will likely now attempt to cite the commons
vote as a means to argue against intervention. Suddenly, Britain’s value as an
unflinching and reliable ally of the USA may find itself questioned by the US
state Department and the Department of Defense.
The rift in UK-US relations may not come as a surprise to
some. In fact, the strength of the
special relationship has been questioned since the Obama administration took
office. The Bush Administration was well
known for its immensely pro-Anglo stance, preferring to rely on Canada, the UK
ad Australia for political support over Europe.
By contrast, Obama has been derided by some critics as being rather cold
towards the UK, despite Cameron’s Atlanticist ideology. Critics would cite the Falkland Islands
dispute as an example of this. Some go
as far to say that the current administration, in actuality, treats the UK on
far less equal terms than the Bush Administration. Obama has instead focused his efforts on
rebuilding America’s ties with the nations that were outraged by the invasion
of Iraq, primarily those in Western Europe.
As a result, how would this latest blunder affect the relationship
between Cameron and a supposedly distant White House?
Move towards France
One theory is that this is the latest example signifying an
increasing reliance on France as the USA’s major military ally for future international
action. France has stated its full support for any military action and that the
UK vote will not change its position towards Syria. Obama has repeatedly stressed ties with
France during his Presidency, especially due to the rift between the two nations
that occurred after the invasion of Iraq.
In the short term this makes strategic sense. The UK is currently undergoing a period of
major retrofits within its Navy and Air Force, which has weakened its
conventional military somewhat. France
on the other hand, is not going through an arduous stage of rearmament anytime
soon so much of its current strike capacity is intact. From a military perspective, France is
currently a more valuable ally for Washington to have.
Previously, the UK has been a more beneficial political ally
due to the UK’s greater international presence and ability to recruit the consent
of its former subjects. This has
declined somewhat in recent years. France however, is slowly being perceived as
the consensual military power of the EU. Germany lacks considerable recognition as a leader in foreign affairs
outside economy, so France is often viewed as the leader of diplomatic and
military power in Western Europe. The UK
will never be perceived as this, having distanced itself from Western Europe
whenever possible. French support does
far more to suggest the presence of a multinational coalition than the UK’s at
this point in time. The perception of
European support is invaluable to Washington for any military strike. There is
hope that France can enlist other European nations to follow suit. How many it can actually persuade however is
a different story. Eastern Europe tends
to position itself more towards the UK so may show some hesitance. Germany will likely refrain from action. Domestic issues in Italy and Spain may also
prevent these two nations from taking part.
Nevertheless, French support can suggest the tacit support of European
nations, who will refrain from damaging relations with France by criticising
the move.
Mutual interest
The Syria crisis has seemingly lead to small friction in UK-US mutual foreign policy commitment. However, despite this, the geopolitical realities transcend and persevere through flashpoints of indecisive governments. The UK has a major interest in retaining the special relationship and vice-versa. For the UK, it is employing a strategy based on being an adaptable and flexible broker between Europe and the United States. The UK will want to keep all of its options whilst pivoting between the two continents. The key part of this strategy is balance. The main reasoning between the balance between the US and Europe for the UK is that the UK can be absorbed too much into US foreign policy, so much so that it becomes akin to a 51st state.
The US sees the UK as a key member to share the burden of conflicts that it chooses to conduct. Most notably, this was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. In sharing the burden, it minimizes the perception of unilateral, oppressing force that is shared by adversaries and challengers to US influence around the globe. It also has the ability to share intelligence and conduct intelligence operations with a stable, well-trusted ally. It also allows the US to exert defence policy in Europe while using Germany as the broker for EU economic commitments.
For the UK, this relationship enables London to keep its options open. If the EU is the collapse and nation-states become the primary institutions of Europe, the UK can rely on political and military weight in enhancing its position and influence in the region. Such a relationship allows the UK to be granted benefits such as extracting special concessions and considerations that other states do not have the position of receiving from the US. Such a relationship allows the UK to influence the only global superpower in the world.
The Obama administration's choice to go to Congress on Syria would probably wouldn't have had happened if the Cameron's cabinet hadn't chosen to do so. This highlights a political unity on domestic and foreign policy levels which both administrations will wish to emphasize. It also highlights the domestic challenges each nation is facing in revitalizing trust in democratic institutions and the marriage between democracy and security. This has been particularly highlighted by comparisons in the media to Iraq and the Snowden affair distorting the perception of democracy in Western countries.
However, geopolitical realities remain, which both nations wish to mould to their own self-interest. As such, despite the recent blip to US-UK relations, in the longer term, these two nations will continue to cooperate at the level for which qualifies them as a special relationship. It would be far more unnatural for these two nations to agree unconditionally on each issue.
Written by Bradley Cole and David Stanton
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